In the 1970s under Michael Manley and the People's National Party (PNP), the Jamaican government embarked on a plan to create "democratic socialism" in the island country. This was an ambitious undertaking for a poor, relatively non-industrial country that had only enjoyed a decade of independence from the British. The difficulty of this task was exacerbated by several factors which will be discussed below. The PNP's goals and initiatives (if taken at face value) would have utterly transformed Jamaican society from a nearly colonial third world type to a modernized, industrial socialist society. This paper will analyze the PNP's efforts within the context of Jamaica's historical conditions and socioeconomic development. It will seek to determine the following: Should one take the claims by the government that it was intent on building 'democratic socialism' at face value? Were Jamaica's socioeconomic conditions sufficient for building socialism of any variety? If successful, would the policies of the PNP government have created socialism? If not, what factors would have been key in determining the direction that the PNP's policy initiatives took? In what ways were this initiative similar and dissimilar to traditional patterns of Jamaican political organization? This paper will take for granted the generally accepted narrative of Jamaican⁽¹⁾ history as presented in most of the larger studies and present that as background for an analysis that varies greatly from those currently extant.

Any thorough study of this period in Jamaican history must discuss the roles of three individuals: Norman Washington Manley, Michael Manley, and Alexander Bustamante. While one would hope to shy away from any regression into 'great man' history, these three figures are prominent, to say the least, throughout this entire period. They are responsible for establishing most of Jamaica's public institutions and headed the government for all but five years⁽²⁾ from the establishment of universal suffrage in 1944 until 1980. Michael Manley will be given a particularly sharp focus in this paper as it is during his tenure as Prime Minister that the move for 'democratic socialism' was launched. Further, the conflict between Manley's apparent desire for a mass based, institutionalized party and the reliance of the PNP on Manley's charisma and oratory skills is, in many ways, indicative of the problems associated with this movement. Rather than assume that these men possessed greater abilities than the average man, one should consider the possibility that Jamaica's status as a small, underdeveloped society may have placed them in a position that few others had the opportunity to inhabit.

The very decision to attempt to create 'democratic socialism' is one which needs to be looked at carefully. It certainly did not leap forth fully grown from Manley's head like Minerva from Jupiter. There are several sets of historical conditions, some particular to Jamaica and the PNP, that need to be understood. An understanding of Jamaica's position as a part of the British Empire and the West Indies is essential to understanding the economic development of the country. The legacy of its role as a sugar plantation society organized around African slavery is important in understanding both the economic and the social development of the nation.

During the first half of the 20^th century the British empire began to disintegrate. Britain had ruled Jamaica for nearly 300 years and was sovereign over people in nearly every corner of the globe. As its power receded, a discernible pattern emerged in the politics of many of its colonies throughout the world. The economic elite of the colonies were often British or the descendants of British emigres. They were racially/ethnically different from the majority population of the colonies. There were varying degrees of resentment toward this elite by the majority population depending upon local conditions. In Jamaica, roughly 90% of the population was black. They were the descendants of slaves who had worked Jamaica's sugar plantations. Many of them still worked on these plantations and actively resented the exploitation of their ancestors and the exploitation which they felt themselves to be the victims of. Under a democratic system with universal suffrage, these white elites were not positioned well for political leadership in the colonies.

In Jamaica, at the turn of the century, the white elite was a prime example of this phenomenon. Many of these men were plantation owners and their descendants. They were the former slave masters who still exploited the black laboring classes of Jamaica. Further, they generally felt themselves to be British rather than Jamaican. The only attempts to assert a Jamaican identity on the part of these men had been an empty threat to declare their independence over fear that the British would emancipate their slaves two generations earlier.⁽³⁾

Situated between the majority black population and the white elite, both financially and racially, was the brown (or coloured) middle class. For much of Jamaica's history these men and women had sought to emulate the upper class. They exhibited a fully colonized mentality in their desire to appear, speak, and live as Englishmen. These cultural characteristics were embodied in the name often given to describe them: Afro-Saxons. The role of this middle class in Jamaica's political development during the 20^th century is much greater than its representation in the population. This is a direct result of the combination of anti-nationalist sentiments by the white elite and the deplorable socioeconomic conditions of the black majority.

Jamaica presents a rather interesting case for practitioners of traditional Marxist or Marxist-Leninist scholarship. In many ways, it fits perfectly into their schema for analyzing both colonialism and capitalism. One cannot deny that Jamaica's small capitalist class had an unusual stranglehold on the scant wealth of the island. A small number of large plantations controlled nearly half of the island's land.⁽⁴⁾ Generally, the land that they controlled was the best agricultural land. The vast majority of decisions effecting the economic development of the island were not made by Jamaicans and often ran counter to their long term interests. The general pattern fits well within the Leninist view of colonialism and will be discussed below (though not in Leninist terms). In spite of these snug fits, the most important dynamic of Jamaican society defies traditional Marxist analysis.

Jamaica's class structure has an undeniable racial dynamic to it. This is, perhaps, one of many reasons why Marxism has failed to attract a mass following in Jamaica (and the Caribbean in general). Jamaica's racial dynamic plays such an important role in the lives of the people that it may seem to be merely another trick of the white man to dismiss it as a 'false consciousness' now that it can no longer be used to provide a justification for slavery. One observer from the 1930s noted that "at first sight it would appear as though Jamaicans had solved the problem of black and white living together on equal terms. Perhaps they have but...there is a good deal of class feeling here which expresses itself openly, and class feeling in a land where practically all the toilers are of one race and all the employers of another"⁽⁵⁾ Jamaica, specifically, is a poor breeding ground for Marxism for two reasons: poor class consciousness and identification and a strong religious tendency. Our observer's comments suggest the former. Although there is much class sentiment in Jamaica, that sentiment more accurately refers to the racial dynamic of the island. The nominally popular organizations (labor unions and political parties) are not organized, funded, or led by the working class. In many ways they function as agents for the type of patron-client relations typical of paternalistic societies. In return for the support of the popular classes, these agencies dispense patronage and other favors.

The social conditions in many colonies had been designed to leave the vast majority of the people unfit to govern themselves. The majority of Jamaicans had been denied access to education and had been excluded from participation in the limited home democracy that had been granted by the British until 1944. The franchise was limited to persons that had paid a qualifying level of taxes. Less than six percent of the population received the franchise under this system. That small percentage came from the wealthy class and represented their interests well⁽⁶⁾. Jamaica devoted a minuscule amount of its resources to education. By 1962 when Jamaica achieved full independence, nearly half of the population was illiterate. Ten years later, nearly 500,000 Jamaicans still lacked the most basic level of literacy.

Jamaican economic development was typical of a colonial society. It was devoted to producing agricultural crops for export. Jamaica's primary export was sugar, but it also did a considerable business in bananas. British economic priorities centered around selling industrial and other value-added goods to its colonies and, later, the world. Tax and tariff policies made it very difficult for colonies such as Jamaica to industrialize. Colonial economic elites were given favorable trade terms for their raw products. The profits which they made were to be used to purchase industrial goods manufactured in Britain.

Jamaica has had a long tradition of violent protest dating back well into the era of slavery. Often, it was not until these protests that local elites and the Crown noticed or chose to act upon festering grievances in the society. The year 1938 included a demonstration of this tradition which was to set Jamaica on the course of national sovereignty. During the 1930s, Jamaica's middle and business classes were concerned with the desperate economic conditions caused by the world depression. As proud Afro-Saxons, they viewed themselves as Jamaican citizens of the British Empire. It was within this context that they sought remedies to their economic troubles, including a push for a greater degree of self-government as a tool to affect economic reforms. While the middle class was busy with these things, the majority of Jamaicans were starving and taking matters into their own hands. 'Labour' riots shook the island and forced the British and the Jamaican elite and middle classes to reconsider Jamaica's political future.

In 1938, the People's National Party was formed. Norman Washington Manley was one of the chief forces behind the formation of this party and was chosen to be its president. Manley had already gained a fair degree of notoriety and respect on the island for his skills as a defense lawyer. He had been sought by several individuals seeking to form nationalist political parties prior to the riots, but had always declined. Manley wrote that "I did not myself understand that we had, in Jamaica, reached the stage where what we needed was to start thinking about self-government⁽⁷⁾" until after the riots. The PNP began as a decidedly middle class party. If it had not been successful in advocating many of its goals, it easily could have been dismissed as nothing much more than a debating society. First and foremost, the PNP was a nationalist party. Its primary goal was to elevate Jamaica to a self governing society, attaining at least the dominion status of Canada and Australia, perhaps even full independence. In 1940, the party officially adopted socialism as its guiding ideology. The party's socialism was a very mild variant of the less than radical Fabianism that guided the British Labour Party. Its economic program was vague and focused on bread and butter issues. The party's ties to the majority of Jamaicans was through the labor unions of the Trades Union Council (TUC). This is yet another way in which it seemed to ape the Labour Party.

The primary figure (or at least the most charismatic) was Alexander Bustamante. Bustamante was Manley's cousin and had been born Alexander Clarke. Clarke left Jamaica as a young man and returned with a fabricated biography that presented him as the adopted son of a castillian Spaniard. He made a name for himself in Jamaica as a letter writer to the Daily Gleaner and as a general rabble rouser⁽⁸⁾. He was arrested for inciting violence during the 1938 riots. He came to be known to most Jamaicans simply as "Busta". In 1942, he had a political falling out with Manley and formed his own trade union group, the Bustamante Industrial Trade Unions (BITU) In less than a year, he had also formed his own political party, affiliated with the BITU, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). From the beginning, the BITU and JLP were Busta's organizations. They were not democratic. In fact, the JLP's constitution stipulated that Busta was President of the party for life. Although the membership of the BITU achieved considerable economic gains, they did so at the cost of control over their aspirations. Busta is quoted in many sources as having told workers during one strike that if he came back from the negotiations and told them that they were going to work for nothing, then they would go back onto the work site and work for nothing. Bustamante's authoritarian personality discredited the BITU in international labor circles. The JLP's initial applications to various regional and international labor organizations were refused for that reason⁽⁹⁾.

Jamaica's middle class political elite chose to cooperate with the British during World War Two in exchange for a guarantee of extensive political reform once the war was over. This was a very different path from that which other colonies such as India took. At this point in time, aluminum was just beginning to become an important metal in industrial production. Jamaica was one of the few areas that had extensive bauxite reserves. Bauxite is the mineral from which aluminum is refined. The possible withholding of Jamaican bauxite could have been used as a bargaining chip with the British, but probably would have carried a heavy price. The PNP's decision to endorse this path was very controversial within the party. The left wing of the party was quite vocally opposed to it⁽¹⁰⁾. In 1944, Jamaica was granted a new constitution. It contained considerable reforms, including universal suffrage. However, it did not fulfill the growing aspirations of Jamaicans and a gradual process of constitutional reform was started. In 1958, Jamaica achieved full internal self-government. Four years later, it was granted independence.

The Westminster parliamentary system which served as a model for most colonial legislatures in the British empire was very formalistic. Without a source of income that did not depend on their daily labor, the average Jamaican lacked the 'leisure' time to run campaigns or learn the game of parliamentary procedure. Both parties depended on middle and upper class leaders for leadership and financing. They depended on the working class for votes. The JLP began the electoral process with a definite advantage over the PNP in this area. They won the first two parliamentary elections and forced the PNP to build its own labor movement, the National Workers Union (NWU). It was from this movement that Michael Manley would later gain prominence.

During most of the 1950s and the early 1960s, Michael Manley worked for the NWU as an organizer. During these years Manley had daily contact with Jamaica's working class. He saw their struggles firsthand. He saw how difficult their lives were⁽¹¹⁾. It was during this time that Manley first seemed to really develop pride in the African heritage of the island. It was also during this time that Manley began to develop the public speaking skills that would serve him so well during the his term as Prime Minister. Manley, like his father⁽¹²⁾ had a terrible fear of public speaking as a young adult. The most important element of Manley's time as a union organizer, however, was that it gave him a base and a reputation that was not dependent on his father.

Norman Washington Manley was a giant in Jamaica. He was widely revered as the father of independence. After his death, he became an official national hero. It is certainly rare for this kind of greatness to fall from father to son. It would have been easy for Michael to have lived in his father's shadow as a party functionary or to use his family's reputation and contacts to build his own fortune. Michael's parents seem to have instilled a strong sense of public service in him. However, he was reluctant to go into politics because he did not wish to live in his father's shadow. In spite of this, he accepted an appointment to the Senate in 1964.

As a nominally socialist party, the PNP was always somewhat vulnerable to charges of communism. The JLP had used various types of 'red smear' tactics against the PNP in nearly every election campaign. Given the varying degrees of success that the red smear had in different campaigns, matters of ideology were frequently discussed in the party as a matter of practical politics as well as in the context of the party's ongoing self-definition. In general, the PNP's moderate and conservative wings came from the business sector of Jamaica's middle and upper class. Although some of its left wing members came from these backgrounds, the tendency was for them to be intellectuals and labor leaders. They were a vital part of the party structure because of their organizing skills and ties to the working class. In 1952, just as the PNP was about to begin its first term in charge of the colonial government, the left wing of the party was expelled. This seemed to quell the debate over socialism within the party as the PNP and JLP came to a consensus over the adoption of the Puerto Rican model of development based on foreign capital for the next decade. It was not until 1964 that the debate over socialism resurfaced.

This debate over socialism culminated in the most 'socialistic' platform that the PNP ever ran on in the 1967 election campaign. This platform called for a greater degree of nationalization of economic assets and a greater introduction of new programs than any platform before or after. This debate over socialism left the party internally divided. In spite of the apparent ascendency of the left as indicated by the radical platform, there was another minor purge of the left. Members of the Young Socialist League (YSL) had decided to work within the PNP to bring a greater socialist orientation to the party. During the debate over socialism, many members were forced leave the YSL or were expelled from the party. The weakened, radicalized PNP of 1967 suffered its worst defeat yet in the elections winning only 37.7% of the vote to the JLP's 62.3%⁽¹³⁾. There was one important victory for the PNP during this election. Michael Manley ran a last minute campaign for the elected House of Representatives. It looked as if one of the PNP's important party members was going to lose his seat. The Party wished to run him in a safer district. Manley reluctantly agreed and in a dismal year for the PNP managed to win his seat. In two years time, he would be elected to succeed his father as President of the PNP. Given the tradition of party leader as parliamentary leader, it is highly unlikely that Michael Manley would ever have been elevated to this post as an appointed Senator.

From the time that Michael Manley succeeded his father as President of the PNP, he began campaigning for the 1972 elections. Manley continued his work in the NWU during this time as well. The 1972 elections were not contested on socialism. Generally, the PNP campaign of 1972 is considered to be a populist campaign. Manley certainly drew on the culture of Jamaica to an unprecedented extent. He drew on the themes of oppression that resonated deeply with the impoverished descendants of slaves. His rhetoric was pregnant with old testament themes and phrases which appealed to both the native Baptist churches and the Rastifarians. The combination of popular religion with the NWU's bread and butter unionism was powerful. The PNP recovered from its crushing 1967 defeat with a substantial victory.

There are many different ideas as to what constitutes socialism. For the purposes of this analysis, a very broad definition will be used. Although it is important to note the definition that the PNP eventually formulated for 'democratic socialism'⁽¹⁴⁾, there is nothing to indicate that this definition guided their polices during the 1970s. Therefore, that definition will not be the basis for our analysis. Socialism presents a fundamental reordering of capitalist property relations. The goal of socialism is to rationalize economic production so that the benefits of industrialization are distributed the greatest number of people. The cornerstone of economic rationalization (whether for socialists or Microsoft) is the ability to plan. In socialism, the state would have control (and perhaps full ownership) of the 'commanding heights' of the economy such as large agriculture, utilities, transportation, and large industry. Economic concerns would no longer be run at the whim of a few capitalists. They would be run by the majority of the population through both 'industrial democracy' and political democracy⁽¹⁵⁾.

If one were to take the political rhetoric of the PNP during this period at face value, then 1974 would mark the return to the PNP's socialist roots and the first real push for 'democratic socialism' in Jamaica. However, Keith and Keith have formulated an analytic paradigm that is useful for grouping the entire period into one coherent whole: national popularism. National popularism is a nationalist reaction to dependant capitalism in nations with a weak working class. It utilizes an activist state as the engine for economic and social development. This is a more articulate version of the vague "leftist nationalism" which many scholars of Latin America refer to. Through the application of this paradigm the contradictions in attempts to portray this period as a true push for 'democratic socialism' are eliminated. The primary flaw in the national popularism model is the authors' focus on similarities between it and fascism. Their case on this point is overstated. It is more useful to view national popularism as a vehicle to arrive at the far less radical destination of social democracy.

If we start with the above definition of socialism, we would have to assume that the minimum that any socialist government would be expected to do would be to begin economic planning. Further, one would expect an economically rational program. This would require the government to plan for the payment of its programs (through taxes, loans, or other fees) before it implemented them. The PNP had always taken its nationalism more seriously than its socialism. The Manley government incorporated this nationalism into its dependency theory based critique of capitalism. It sought greater self sufficiency through the utilization of uncultivated farmland, a decrease of exports which drain foreign currency reserves, and limits on the transfer of capital out of the country. These policies leading toward greater self-sufficiency as well as the rhetoric of anti-imperialism made it very difficult for Jamaica to borrow money to finance its programs.

The rhetoric of socialism began in 1974 even though the bulk of the economic programs instituted by the PNP came about in the 1972-74 period that most scholars refer to as populist. Jamaican columnist Suzann Dodd writes that:

"When Michael came to power, only the wealthy went to High School. A 3/4th scholarship was far beyond the pocket of the lower class person. Eight shillings a day was basic wage, and having to pay L2 a month for a child's education was as far beyond their pocket as a car. Michael changed that. He made all Secondary and Tertiary institutions free. If you qualified you entered.Thousands of children went to High School, where lunch was subsidized. 49c got you a plate of rice, meat, vegetables and a milk."⁽¹⁶⁾

The only year during the 'socialist' period that included significant reforms was the transition year of 1974. From 1975 on, the reforms slowed to a trickle. Many of the reforms initiated during 1974 were more social in nature and did not require government funding. Suzann Dodd notes that "In 1974 trailer load of social legislation hit the Books; Equal Pay for Equal Work, Status of Children (no more bastards) Maternity Leave with Pay, Minimum Wage Act, Termination and Redundancy Pay, Holiday with Pay Act, etc."⁽¹⁷⁾

Jamaican foreign policy under Manley took a decidedly internationalist and independent tone. Previous administrations had been decidedly pro-western. Busta had even offered the use of Jamaica as a naval base for the U.S. Manley become a leader in the non-aligned movement and sought closer relations and trade with the socialist bloc. This was consistent with the nationalist and socialist tendencies of the PNP. However, it made both the U.S. government and the Jamaican capitalists nervous. Particularly bothersome was the Manley government's increasing ties with Cuba. These made his government increasingly vulnerable to the red smear tactics of the JLP. Manley has written repeatedly that the CIA and JLP were behind (and possibly in cooperation) a concerted policy of destabilization to remove a government whose polices challenged the status quo.

Many of the Manley government's policies were damaging to its supposed long-term goals. Jamaica failed to adequately diversify its economy. Bauxite and aluminum continued to be the most important industrial sector on the island. The bauxite levy which is generally lauded as one the Manley government's greatest achievements actually served to increase the island's dependency on this sector of the economy. As the worldwide crisis of capitalism in the 1970s became acute, Jamaica's dependency was highlighted. Between its total dependence on world energy markets, and the bauxite and aluminum industry, and tourism for sources of foreign exchange, Jamaica was shown to be utterly non-self sufficient. The way in which the Manley government responded to this crisis was the true test of its commitment to socialism.

In spite of growing economic difficulties, the majority of Jamaicans supported the direction of the PNP government. The 1976 elections were challenged quite explicitly on 'socialism'. The PNP handed the JLP a crushing defeat. However, almost immediately after the elections, the PNP made an agreement with the primary agency of international capitalist orthodoxy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To their credit, the PNP tried to keep the IMF's prescriptions from hurting the poorest of its citizens who were so regularly targeted by IMF programs in other countries. It did so by creating a dual exchange rate that imported food and necessities at one rate and luxury goods at another. The IMF reluctantly approved this arrangement. As soon as economic conditions in Jamaica gave them greater leverage, the IMF forced a full currency devaluation of 40 percent. Generally, the IMF seemed to take an unusually harsh attitude toward Jamaica. By the time that elections were called for 1980, IMF policies had undone nearly all of economic benefits that the Jamaican people had received under the Manley government and the PNP was soundly defeated.

As a well known, vocal, and articulate critic of the role of the IMF in international economics, it is difficult to understand why Manley the self-proclaimed socialist would have turned to it for "assistance" in overcoming Jamaica's economic difficulties. The PNP's left had turned to a group of intellectuals from the University of the West Indies to formulate a plan that would not involve the IMF. These were not just a group of random leftist intellectuals. Many of them had been actively involved in the Manley government and were some of the most internationally prominent dependency theorists. They devised an alternate plan called the People's Production Plan that sought to deepen the social transformation that had begun under the PNP and create greater self-sufficiency and egalitarianism in the economy. The viability of this plan is still a hotly contested issue, not only among the Jamaican left, but of outside scholars as well. In this case even hindsight is not 20/20, but Stephens and Stephens evaluate the plan more thoroughly than any other scholars and are correct when they note that:

"Even if we make a number of negative assumptions about the plan with regard to its inflationary impact and the limited foreign exchange budget, it is unlikely that the People's Plan would have resulted in the degree of suffering which the IMF produced, though there is not doubt that the People's Plan would have imposed hardship and demanded sacrifice of many people...The degree of economic reorientation demanded by the Plan was bound to create at least some hiatus in production, but unlike the IMF plan, it long term effects would have been positive. It would have made the Jamaican economy more self-reliant, more viable, and more egalitarian."

Michael Manley is often referred to (in varying degrees) as a messianic figure by both his supporters and detractors alike. He was a man who spoke simply, eloquently, and movingly of the virtue of "struggle"⁽¹⁸⁾. Yet, when Jamaica was faced with the choice between suffering and struggle, Manley chose the path of suffering. He fell back into the traditional patterns of his class. Rather than depend on the Jamaican people, he sought the assistance of international capital knowing, almost certainly, that it would end Jamaica's burgeoning socialism. This final path demonstrates more than anything the veracity of the Keith and Keith argument. Manley's use of religious rhetoric, his strengthening of Jamaica's dependence of bauxite rather than diversifying the economy, and his choice to rely on the IMF to bail Jamaica out of its economic and financial difficulties are the three points that represent the beginning, middle, and end of this time period. None of them are socialist and, in fact, were detrimental to any attempt at building socialism. The first two were very popular. They were thoroughly cloaked in Jamaican nationalism. The final action was indicative both of Manley and the PNP's class origins and of the mind set of a (once) colonial citizen who ultimately sought solutions and authorities from outside of his own people. It is outside of the scope of this paper to psychoanalyze Michael Manley in an attempt to determine whether or not his commitment to socialism was genuine. However, it is clear that many of the policies that he and his government pursued were counterproductive to an attempt at building socialism. At the same time, many of these same polices were highly nationalistic. The practical effect of these choices was such that the final analysis of Manley's government is that it much more closely fits into the category of national popularism than it does into any brand of socialism.

Bibliography

Burns, E. Bradford, Latin America: Conflict and Creation. Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1993.

Delgado-Figueroa, J., The Rhetoric of Change: Metaphor and Politics in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Hispanic Caribbean Press: Columbia South Carolina, 1994.

Harrington, Michael, Socialism: Past and Future. Arcade Publishing: New York, 1989.

Heuman, Gad J., Between Black and White: Race, Politics, and the Free Coloreds in Jamaica, 1792-1865. Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1981.

Hillman, Richard S. and D'Agostino, Thomas J., Distant Neighbors in the Caribbean: The Dominican Republic and Jamaica in Comparative Perspective. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1992.

Keith, Nelson W. and Keith, Novella Z., The Social Origins of Democratic Socialism in Jamaica. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1984.

Levi, Darrell, Michael Manley: The Making of a Leader. The University of Georgia Press: Athens, GA, 1989.

Manley, Michael, The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament. A Deutsch Publishers: London, 1990.

Manley, Michael, The Poverty of Nations: Reflections on Underdevelopment and the World Economy. Pluto Press: Concord, MA, 1991.

Manley, Michael, Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society: London, 1982.

Mintz, Sidney, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History. Penguin Books: New York, 1985.

Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press: New York, 1991.

Ranston, Jackie, From We Were Boys: The Story of the Magnificent cousins Manley and Bustamante. The Bustamante Institute of Public and International Affairs: Kingston, Jamaica, 1989.

Sherlock, Philip and Bennett, Hazel, The Story of the Jamaican People. Markus Wiener Publishers: Princeton, NJ, 1998.

Stephens, Evelyne Huber and Stephens, John D., Democratic Socialism in Jamaica: The Political Movement and Social Transformation in Dependent Capitalism. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1986.

Manley, Michael: Speech to the PNP Annual Convention, 9/19/1976-on tape, original source unknown.

http://www.jatoday.com.jm/politics/manley3.html#P.JPri

http://www.jatoday.com.jm/politics/timeline.html

http://discoverjamaica.com/gleaner/discover/tour_ja/govpol.htm

http://www.leevalley.co.uk/yush/rewind/yush0202/yojam.htm

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43/034.html

http://www.jatoday.com.jm/politics/manley2.html

Works Cited

Heuman, Gad J., Between Black and White: Race, Politics, and the Free Coloreds in Jamaica, 1792-1865. Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1981.